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When economists model the behavior of individual investors, they typically assume that
these investors derive utility only from consumption or from total wealth. In this paper,
we study the possibility that investors also derive utility from another source, namely from
realized gains and losses on assets that they own. Suppose, for example, that an investor buys
shares of a stock and then, a few months later, sells them. We consider a model in which he
receives a burst of utility right then, at the moment of sale. The amount of utility depends
on the size of the gain or loss realized—on the diﬀerence between the sale price and the
purchase price—and is positive if the investor realizes a gain, and negative otherwise. This
source of utility, which we label “realization utility,” is not new to our paper: other authors
also discuss it. Our contribution is to oﬀer a comprehensive analysis of its implications for
trading behavior and for asset prices.
Why might an investor derive utility from realizing a gain or loss? We think that realiza-
tion utility is a consequence of two underlying cognitive processes. The ﬁrst has to do with
how people think about their investing history. Under this view, people do not think about
their investing history purely in terms of the return they have earned on their portfolio.
Rather, they often think about it as a series of investing episodes, each one deﬁned by three
things: the name of the investment, the purchase price, and the sale price. “I bought IBM
at $80 and sold it at $100” might be one such episode. “We bought our house for $260,000
and sold it for $320,000” might be another.
The second cognitive process that, in our view, underlies realization utility has to do with
how people evaluate their investing episodes. We suspect that many investors use a simple
heuristic to guide their trading, one that says: “Selling a stock at a gain relative to purchase
price is a good thing—it is what successful investors do.” After all, an investor who buys a
number of stocks in sequence and manages to realize a gain on all of them does end up with
more money than he had at the start. The ﬂip side of the same heuristic says: “Selling a
stock at a loss is a bad thing—it is what unsuccessful investors do.” Indeed, an investor who
buys a number of stocks in sequence and realizes a loss on all of them does e n du pw i t hl e s s
money than he had at the start.
In summary, an investor feels good when he sells a stock at a gain because, by selling, he
is creating what he views as a positive investing episode. Conversely, he feels bad when he
sells a stock at a loss because, by selling, he is creating what he views as a negative investing
episode.
We do not expect realization utility to be important for all investors or in all circum-
2stances. For example, we expect it to matter more for individual investors than for institu-
tional investors who, as trained professionals, are more likely to think about their investing
history in terms of overall portfolio return than as a series of investing episodes. Also, since
realization utility depends on the diﬀerence between sale price and purchase price, it is likely
to play a larger role when the purchase price is more salient. It may therefore be more
relevant to the trading of individual stocks or to the sale of real estate than to the trading
of mutual funds: the purchase price of a stock or of a house is typically more salient than
that of a fund.
In our view, the idea that some investors derive utility directly from realizing gains and
losses is a plausible one. But in order to claim that realization utility is a signiﬁcant driver
of investor behavior, we cannot appeal to mere plausibility. To make a more convincing case,
we need to build a model of realization utility and then see if the model explains a range of
facts and leads to new predictions that can be tested and conﬁrmed.
In this paper, we take up this challenge. We construct a model of realization utility,
discuss its predictions, and show that it can shed light on a number of empirical facts.
We start with a partial equilibrium framework but also show how realization utility can be
embedded in a full equilibrium model. This allows us to make predictions not only about
trading behavior but also about prices.
Our partial equilibrium model is an inﬁnite horizon model in which, at each moment, an
investor allocates his wealth either to a risk-free asset or to one of a number of stocks. If the
investor sells his holdings of a stock, he receives a burst of utility based on the size of the
gain or loss realized and pays a proportional transaction cost. He also faces the possibility
of a random liquidity shock: if such a shock occurs, he must immediately sell his asset
holdings and exit the asset markets. At each moment, the investor makes his allocation
decision by maximizing the discounted sum of expected future utility ﬂows. In our baseline
model, we assume a linear functional form for realization utility. Later, we also consider a
piecewise-linear speciﬁcation.
We ﬁnd that, under the optimal strategy, an investor who is holding a position in a
stock will voluntarily sell this position only if the stock price rises suﬃciently far above the
purchase price. We look at how this “liquidation point” at which the investor sells depends
on the expected stock return, the standard deviation of the stock return, the time discount
rate, the transaction cost, and the likelihood of a liquidity shock.
The model has a number of interesting implications. One of the more striking is that,
even if realization utility has a linear or concave functional form, the investor can be risk
3seeking: all else equal, his initial value function can be an increasing function of the standard
deviation of stock returns. The intuition is straightforward. A highly volatile stock oﬀers
the chance of a large gain which the investor can enjoy realizing. Of course, it may also drop
a lot in value; but in that case, the investor will simply postpone selling the stock until he is
forced to sell by a liquidity shock. Any realized loss therefore lies in the distant, discounted
future and does not scare the investor very much at the time of purchase. Overall, then, the
investor may prefer more volatility to less.
We use our model to link realization utility to a number of ﬁnancial phenomena. Among
the applications we discuss are the disposition eﬀect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean,
1998), the subpar trading performance of individual investors (Barber and Odean, 2000;
Barber et al., 2009), the higher volume of trade in bull markets than in bear markets (Stein,
1995; Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink, 2006; Griﬃn, Nardari, and Stulz, 2007), the eﬀect
of historical highs on the propensity to sell (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), the individual
investor preference for volatile stocks (Kumar, 2009), the low average return of volatile
stocks (Ang et al., 2006), and the heavy trading associated with highly valued assets—as,
for example, in the case of U.S. technology stocks in the late 1990s (Hong and Stein, 2007).
Of these applications of realization utility, the most obvious is the disposition eﬀect, the
greater propensity of individual investors to sell stocks that have risen in value, rather than
fallen in value, since purchase. In combination with a suﬃciently positive time discount rate,
realization utility generates a strong disposition eﬀect: the investor in our model voluntarily
sells a stock only if it is trading at a gain relative to purchase price.
While the link between realization utility and the disposition eﬀect is clear, we emphasize
that realization utility is not a “relabeling” of the disposition eﬀect. On the contrary, it is
just one of a number of possible theories of the disposition eﬀect and can be distinguished
from other theories through carefully constructed tests. For example, another theory of the
disposition eﬀect, one that has nothing to do with realization utility, is that investors have
an irrational belief in mean-reversion. Later in the paper, we discuss an experiment that can
distinguish this view from the realization utility view.
Our other applications are more subtle. For example, our model predicts that individual
investors—the investor group that is more likely to think in terms of realization utility—will
have a much greater propensity to sell a stock once its price moves above its historical high.
Imagine a stock that rises to a high of $45, falls, and then rises again, passing its previous
high of $45 and continuing upwards. Our model predicts that there will be relatively little
selling as the stock approaches $45 for the second time—any realization utility investors with
4liquidation points of $45 or lower will have sold already when the stock ﬁrst approached $45—
but once the stock moves above the historical high of $45, realization utility investors with
liquidation points higher than $45 will start to sell. In line with the evidence of Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001), then, our model predicts that historical highs will have a sharp eﬀect
on individual investors’ propensity to sell.
The idea that people derive utility from gains and losses rather than from ﬁnal wealth
levels was ﬁrst proposed by Markowitz (1952), but is particularly associated with Kahneman
and Tversky (1979): it is a central element of their prospect theory model of decision-making.
Finance researchers have typically taken Kahneman and Tversky’s message to be that they
should study models in which investors derive utility from paper gains and losses. Benartzi
and Thaler (1995), for example, assume that investors derive utility from ﬂuctuations in
their ﬁnancial wealth, while Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang
(2001) assume that they derive utility from ﬂuctuations in the value of their stock market
holdings or in the value of speciﬁc stocks that they own.
The idea that people might derive utility from realized gains and losses has received
much less attention. The concept ﬁrst appears in Shefrin and Statman (1985). Among
several other contributions, these authors point out, with the help of a numerical example,
that if an investor derives utility from realized gains and losses and has a utility function
that, as in prospect theory, is concave over gains and convex over losses, then he will exhibit
a disposition eﬀect.
Shefrin and Statman (1985) justify their emphasis on realized gains and losses by reference
to “mental accounting,” a term used to describe how people think about, organize, and
evaluate their ﬁnancial transactions. In their view, when an investor sells a stock, he is
closing a mental account that was opened when he ﬁrst bought the stock. The moment of
sale is therefore a natural time at which to evaluate the transaction: a realized gain is seen
as a good outcome and a realized loss as a poor outcome. Realized gains and losses thereby
become carriers of utility in their own right. Although described using diﬀerent language,
this motivation for realization utility is similar to our own.1
More recently, Barberis and Xiong (2009) use a two-period model to study the trading
behavior of an investor who derives utility from realized gains and losses with a utility
function that is concave over gains and convex over losses. They observe that, consistent
with Shefrin and Statman (1985), the investor often exhibits a disposition eﬀect. They
1Other authors also discuss realization utility. For example, Thaler (1999) writes that “one clear intuition
is that a realized loss is more painful than a paper loss. When a stock is sold, the gain or loss has to be
‘declared’ both to the tax authorities and to the investor (and spouse).”
5do not study any other implications of realization utility, nor do they link it to any other
applications.2
In this paper, we oﬀer a more comprehensive analysis of realization utility. We construct
a richer model—an inﬁnite horizon model that allows for transaction costs and a stochastic
liquidity shock. We derive an analytical solution for the investor’s optimal trading strategy.
We show how realization utility can be incorporated into both a model of trading behavior
and a model of asset pricing. We document several basic implications of realization utility.
And we discuss many potential applications, rather than just one.
In Section 2, we present a partial equilibrium model of realization utility, one that also
assumes a linear functional form for the realization utility term. In Section 3, we use a
piecewise-linear functional form. In Section 4, we show how realization utility can be em-
bedded in a model of asset prices. Section 5 discusses a range of applications and testable
predictions, while Section 6 concludes.
2. A model of realization utility
Before presenting our model, we brieﬂy note two of our assumptions. First, we assume
that realization utility is deﬁned at the level of an individual asset—a stock, a house, or a
mutual fund, say. Realization utility is triggered by the act of selling. But when an investor
makes a sale, he is selling a speciﬁc asset. It is therefore natural to deﬁne realization utility
at the level of this asset. This assumption has little bite in our baseline model because, in
this model, the investor holds at most one risky asset at any time. However, it becomes
more important when we discuss an extension of our model in which the investor can hold
several risky assets simultaneously.
A second assumption concerns the functional form for realization utility. In this section,
we use a linear functional form so as to show that we do not need elaborate speciﬁcations in
order to draw interesting implications out of realization utility. In Section 3, we also consider
a piecewise-linear functional form.
We work in an inﬁnite horizon, continuous time framework. An investor starts at time
0 with wealth W0.A te a c ht i m et ≥ 0, he has the following investment options: a risk-free
asset, which oﬀers a constant continuously compounded return of r;a n dN risky assets
indexed by i ∈{ 1,...,N}. The most natural application of our model is to understanding
2Barberis and Xiong (2009) do not say very much about realization utility because it is not their main
focus. Their paper is primarily about the trading behavior of an investor who derives prospect theory utility
from paper gains and losses.
6how individual investors trade stocks in their brokerage accounts. We therefore often refer
to the risky assets as stocks.
The price of stock i, Si,t, follows
dSi,t
Si,t
=( r + μ)dt + σdZi,t,( 1 )
where Zi,t is a Brownian motion and where, for i  = j, dZi,t and dZj,t may be correlated. In
the interval between t and t + dt,s t o c ki also pays a dividend ﬂow of
Di,tdt = αSi,tdt.( 2 )
The stock’s expected excess return—throughout the paper, “excess” means over and above
the risk-free rate—is therefore α + μ: the dividend yield α plus the expected excess capital
gain μ. For now, we assume that each of α, μ,a n dσ is the same for all stocks.
The dividends Di,t do not play a signiﬁcant role in the partial equilibrium analysis in
Sections 2 and 3. The only reason we introduce them is because, as we will see in Section
4, they make it easier to embed realization utility in a full equilibrium framework. To
prevent the dividends from unnecessarily complicating the analysis, we make the following
assumptions about them: that the investor consumes them; and that he receives linear
consumption utility
v(c)=βc (3)
from doing so, where β determines the importance of consumption utility relative to the
second source of utility that we introduce below.
We assume that, at each time t, the investor either allocates all of his wealth to the
risk-free asset or all of his wealth to one of the stocks; for simplicity, no other allocations are
allowed. Therefore, over any interval of time during which the investor maintains a position






(μdt + σdZi,t)θi,t,( 4 )
where θi,t takes the value one if he is holding stock i at time t, and zero otherwise. Note
that, if θi,t =1f o rs o m ei and t,t h e nθj,t =0f o ra l lj  = i. We also suppose that, if the
investor sells his position in a stock at time t, he pays a proportional transaction cost kWt,
0 ≤ k<1.
An important variable in our model is Bt. This variable, which is formally deﬁned only
if the investor is holding a stock at time t, measures the cost basis of the stock position, in
7other words, the reference point relative to which the investor computes his realized gain or
loss. One possible deﬁnition of the cost basis is the amount of money the investor put into
the time t stock position at the time he bought it. This is the deﬁnition we use, with one
adjustment. We take the cost basis to be the amount of money the investor put into the
stock position at the time he bought it, scaled up by the risk-free return between the time
of purchase and time t, so that
Bt = Wse
r(t−s),( 5 )
where s ≤ t is the moment at which the time t stock position was purchased. This deﬁnition
is tractable and may be more realistic than the alternative that sets the cost basis equal to
the original purchase price: the investor may only think of an investing episode as a positive
one if the capital gain exceeds what he could have earned by investing in the risk-free asset.
The key feature of our model is that the investor derives utility from realizing a gain or
loss. If, at time t, he moves his wealth from a stock into the risk-free asset or into another
stock, he receives a burst of utility given by
u((1 − k)Wt − Bt). (6)
The argument of the utility term is the realized gain or loss: the investor’s wealth at the
moment of sale net of the transaction cost, (1 − k)Wt, minus the cost basis of the stock
investment Bt. Throughout this section, we use the linear functional form
u(x)=x.( 7 )
We emphasize that the investor only receives the burst of utility in (6) if he moves his
wealth from a stock into the risk-free asset or into another stock. If he sells a stock and then
immediately puts the proceeds back into the same stock, he derives no realization utility
from the sale, nor is the cost basis aﬀected. Realization utility is associated with the end
of an investing episode. It is hard to argue that the sale of a stock represents the end of an
episode if, after selling the stock, the investor immediately buys it back.
We assume that the investor does not incur a transaction cost if he sells the risk-free
asset. If we measure the cost basis for this asset in the same way as for a stock, it follows
that the realized gain or loss from selling the risk-free asset is always zero. The investor
therefore receives realization utility only when he sells a stock, not when he sells the risk-free
asset.
The investor also faces the possibility of a random liquidity shock whose arrival is gov-
erned by a Poisson process with parameter ρ. If a shock occurs, the investor immediately
8sells his holdings, exits the asset markets, and, if he was holding a stock at the time of the
shock, receives the burst of utility in (6). We think of this shock as capturing a sudden
consumption need that forces the investor to draw on the funds in his brokerage account.
We include it because it ensures, as is reasonable, that the investor cares not only about
realized gains and losses but also about paper gains and losses. It also gives us a way of
varying the investor’s horizon: when ρ is high, the investor eﬀectively has a short horizon;
when it is low, he has a long horizon.
At each moment, the investor makes his allocation decision by maximizing the discounted
sum of expected future utility ﬂows. Suppose that, at time t, his wealth is allocated to a
stock. His value function then depends on two things: on the current value of his position,
Wt, and on the cost basis of the position, Bt. We therefore denote it as V (Wt,B t). Since
the utility functions in (3) and (7) are homogeneous of degree one, and since the prices
of the risky assets all follow geometric Brownian motions, the value function must also be
homogeneous of degree one, so that, for ζ>0,
V (ζWt,ζB t)=ζV(Wt,B t). (8)
Now suppose that, for some positive W,
V (W, W) ≥ 0. (9)
Note that V (W, W) is the value function that corresponds to investing wealth W in a stock
now, so that current wealth and the cost basis are both equal to W.S i n c e V (Wt,B t)i s
homogeneous of degree one, if (9) holds for some positive W, then it holds for all positive
W. Later, we will compute the range of parameter values for which (9) holds. For now,
we note that, so long as the time discount rate δ exceeds the risk-free return r, condition
(9) implies two things. First, it implies that, at time 0, the investor allocates his wealth
to one of the N stocks: since the risk-free asset generates no utility ﬂows, he allocates to a
stock as early as possible. Second, and using the same logic, condition (9) implies that, if,
at any time t>0, the investor sells his holdings of a stock, he will then immediately use the
proceeds to buy another stock.
We can now formulate the investor’s decision problem. Suppose that, at time t,t h e
investor is holding stock i.L e t τ  be the random future time at which a liquidity shock
occurs. Then, at time t, the investor solves
V (Wt,B t)=m a x
τ≥t Et{





−δ(τ−t)[u((1 − k)Wτ − Bτ)+V ((1 − k)Wτ,(1 − k)Wτ)]I{τ<τ }
+ e
−δ(τ −t)u((1 − k)Wτ  − Bτ )I{τ≥τ }}, (10)
9subject to (3), (4), (5), and (7). I{} is an indicator function that takes the value one if
the condition in the curly brackets is met, and zero otherwise. To ensure that the investor
does not hold his time 0 stock position forever, without selling it, we impose the following
parameter restriction, which, in words, requires that the expected excess capital gain is not
too high:











Note that this implies μ<ρ+ δ − r, a simpler condition that we will sometimes also use.
To understand the formulation in (10), note that the investor’s problem is to choose the
optimal time τ, a random time in the future, at which to realize the gain or loss in his stock
holdings. Suppose ﬁrst that τ<τ  , so that the investor voluntarily sells the stock before a
liquidity shock arrives. In this case, the investor receives a burst of utility u((1−k)Wτ −Bτ)
when he sells at time τ; and a cash balance of (1 − k)Wτ which he immediately invests
in another stock. If τ ≥ τ , however, the investor is forced out of the stock market by a
liquidity shock and receives realization utility u((1−k)Wτ −Bτ ) from the gain or loss at the
moment of exit. Finally, while holding the stock, the investor receives a continuous stream
of dividends.
The proposition below presents the solution to the decision problem in (10). It states
that if the investor buys a stock, his optimal strategy is to sell it voluntarily only if its price





—in words, the value of the stock position the investor is holding at time t relative to its cost
basis—plays an important role in the solution. To simplify the statement of the proposition,
we deﬁne
δ
  ≡ δ − r. (13)
As we will see, the investor’s behavior does not depend on δ and r separately, but only on
the diﬀerence between them. We sometimes refer to δ  as the “eﬀective” discount rate and
assume throughout that δ  > 0. The proof of the proposition is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Unless forced to exit the stock market by a liquidity shock, an investor with
the decision problem in (10) will sell his holdings of a stock if the gain gt = Wt/Bt reaches
a liquidation point gt = g∗ ≥ 1. If the transaction cost k is positive, then g∗ > 1.T h ev a l u e
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∗ + 1 = 0. (17)
In summary, the optimal strategy takes one of two forms. If the model parameters are
such that U(1) ≥ 0, where U(1) is the value function per unit wealth from buying a stock
at time 0—equivalently, if condition (9) holds—the investor buys a stock at time 0 and
voluntarily sells it only if it reaches a suﬃciently high liquidation point, at which time he
immediately invests the proceeds in another stock, and so on. In particular, the investor
never voluntarily sells a stock at a loss. If, on the other hand, U(1) < 0, the investor allocates
his wealth to the risk-free asset at time 0 and keeps it there until a liquidity shock arrives.4
For expositional simplicity, we have assumed that the investor holds at most one stock at
any time. However, Proposition 1 can also tell us how the investor trades in a setting where
he holds several stocks simultaneously. Suppose that, at time 0, he spreads his wealth across
a number of stocks. Suppose also, as is natural in the case of realization utility, that he
derives utility separately from the realized gain or loss on each stock. Finally, suppose that
if a liquidity shock occurs, the investor sells all of his holdings and exits the asset markets.
Under these assumptions, the investor’s decision problem is “separable” across the diﬀerent
stocks he is holding and the solution to (10) in Proposition 1 describes how he trades each
one of his stocks.
3Since g∗ ≥ 1, the term U(1) which appears in the second row of Eq. (14) can be obtained from the ﬁrst
row of the equation. It equals a +( αβ + ρ(1 − k))/(ρ + δ  − μ) − ρ/(ρ + δ ).
4To be clear, if g∗ =1 .05, say, the investor sells his holdings of a stock once the value of the position is
5% higher than the cost basis. Given the deﬁnition of the cost basis in (5), this means that the value of the
position at the time of sale is more than 5% higher than it was at the time of purchase.
11A corollary to Proposition 1—one that also holds for the piecewise-linear speciﬁcation
we consider in Section 3—is that, in this multiple-concurrent-stock extension of our basic
model, the investor is indiﬀerent to diversiﬁcation. For example, he is indiﬀerent between
investing W0 in just one stock at time 0 as compared to investing W0/2i ne a c ho ft w os t o c k s
at time 0. The time 0 value function for the ﬁrst strategy, W0U(1), is the same as the time
0 value function for the second strategy, namely W0U(1)/2+W0U(1)/2.
2.1. Results
In this section, and again in Section 3, we draw out the implications of realization utility
through two kinds of analysis. First, we compute the range of parameter values for which
condition (9) holds, so that the investor is willing to buy a stock at time 0. Second, we look
at how the liquidation point g∗ and initial utility per unit wealth U(1) depend on each of
the model parameters. The ﬁrst analysis therefore concerns the investor’s buying behavior,
and the second, his selling behavior. When assigning parameter values, we have in mind our
model’s most natural application, namely, the trading of stocks by individual investors.
The shaded area in the top graph in Fig. 1 shows the range of values of the expected
excess stock return α+μ and standard deviation of stock returns σ that satisfy U(1) ≥ 0—in
other words, condition (9)—so that the investor is willing to buy a stock at time 0, but also
the restriction in (11), so that he sells the stock at a ﬁnite liquidation point.5
To create the graph, we assign values to δ , k, ρ, α,a n dβ, and then search for values of
μ and σ such that both U(1) ≥ 0 and condition (11) hold. We set the transaction cost to
k =0 .005 and the liquidity shock intensity ρ to 0.1, so that the probability of a shock over
the course of a year is 1 − e−0.1 ≈ 0.1. We also set the dividend yield α to 0.015 and the
consumption utility weight β to 1. Finally, we choose an eﬀective discount rate of δ  =0 .08
because, as we will see later, this generates a trading frequency similar to that observed in
actual brokerage accounts.
The graph illustrates an interesting implication of realization utility, namely that the
investor is willing to buy a stock with a negative expected excess return, so long as its
standard deviation σ is suﬃciently high. The intuition is straightforward. So long as σ is
suﬃciently high, even a negative expected excess return stock has a non-negligible chance of
reaching the liquidation point g∗, at which time the investor can enjoy realizing a gain. Of
course, more likely than not, the stock will perform poorly. However, since the investor does
5The unshaded area in the bottom-left of the graph corresponds to parameter values for which U(1) < 0,
so that the investor does not buy a stock at time 0. The unshaded area in the right of the graph corresponds
to parameter values that violate restriction (11).
12not voluntarily realize losses, this will only bring him disutility in the event of a liquidity
shock. Any realized loss therefore lies in the distant, discounted future and does not scare
the investor very much at the time of purchase. Overall, then, investing in a stock with a
low expected return can sometimes be better than investing in the risk-free asset.
Figs. 2 and 3 show how the liquidation point g∗ and initial utility per unit wealth U(1)
depend on the parameters μ, σ, δ , k,a n dρ. The graphs on the left side of each ﬁgure
correspond to the liquidation point, and those on the right side, to initial utility. For now,
we focus on the solid lines; we discuss the dashed lines in Section 3.
To construct the graphs, we start with a set of benchmark parameter values. We use the
same benchmark values throughout the paper. Consider ﬁrst the asset-level parameters α, μ,
σ,a n dk. We assume a dividend yield α of 0.015, an expected excess capital gain on stocks
of μ =0 .015—note that this implies an expected excess stock return of α + μ =0 .03—a
standard deviation of stock returns of σ =0 .5, and a transaction cost of k =0 .005. As for
the investor-level parameters δ , ρ,a n dβ, we use an eﬀective time discount rate of δ  =0 .08,
a liquidity shock intensity of ρ =0 .1, and a consumption utility weight of β = 1. The graphs
in Figs. 2 and 3 vary each of μ, σ, δ , k,a n dρ in turn, keeping the other parameters ﬁxed
at their benchmark values.
The top-right graph in Fig. 2 shows that, as is natural, initial utility is increasing in the
expected excess capital gain μ. The top-left graph shows that the liquidation point is also
increasing in μ: if a stock that is trading at a gain has a high expected return, the investor
is tempted to hold on to it rather than to sell it and incur a transaction cost.
The middle-right graph illustrates an important implication of realization utility: that,
as stock return volatility goes up, initial utility also goes up. Put diﬀerently, even though
realization utility has a linear functional form, the investor is risk seeking. The intuition for
this parallels the intuition for why the investor is sometimes willing to buy a stock with a
low expected return. The more volatile a stock is, the more likely it is to reach its liquidation
point, at which time the investor can enjoy realizing a gain. Of course, a volatile stock may
also decline a lot in value. But the investor does not voluntarily realize losses and so will
only experience disutility in the event of a liquidity shock. Any realized loss therefore lies
in the distant, discounted future and does not scare the investor very much at the time of
purchase. Overall, then, the investor prefers more volatility to less.6 A similar intuition
explains why, in the middle-left graph, the liquidation point is increasing in volatility.
6In mathematical terms, this prediction is related to the fact that, while instantaneous utility is linear,
the value function U (gt) in (14) is convex: since, from (11), μ<ρ+ δ , we have γ1 > 1a n da>0, which,
in turn, imply the convexity of U(·).
13The trading patterns we have just described—the buying of low expected return stocks
and the preference for volatile stocks—are not behaviors that we associate with sophisticated
investors. We emphasize, however, that our model is not a model of sophisticated investors.
It is a model of unsophisticated investors—speciﬁcally, of investors who use a simple heuristic
to guide their trading, one that says that selling an asset at a gain is a good thing and that
selling an asset at a loss is a bad thing. What Figs. 1 and 2 demonstrate is that an investor
who thinks in these terms can be drawn into stocks with low expected returns and high
volatility. We discuss some evidence consistent with this prediction in Section 5.7
The bottom-left graph in Fig. 2 shows that when the investor discounts the future more
heavily, the liquidation point falls. An investor with a high discount rate is impatient and
therefore wants to realize gains sooner rather than later.
The top graphs in Fig. 3 show how the liquidation point and initial utility depend on
the transaction cost k. As expected, a higher transaction cost lowers time 0 utility. It also
increases the liquidation point: if it is costly to sell a stock, the investor waits longer before
doing so.
What happens when there is no transaction cost? The top-left graph in Fig. 3 suggests
that, in this case, the liquidation point is g∗ = 1. It is straightforward to check that when
k = 0, (17) is indeed satisﬁed by g∗ = 1, so that the investor realizes all gains immediately.
In other words, in our model, it is the transaction cost that stops the investor from realizing
all gains as soon as they appear.
The bottom graphs in Fig. 3 show how the liquidation point and initial utility depend
on ρ, the intensity of the liquidity shock. The liquidation point depends on ρ in a non-
monotonic way. There are two forces at work here. As the liquidity shock intensity ρ goes
up, the liquidation point initially falls. One reason the investor delays realizing a gain is the
transaction cost that a sale entails. For ρ>0, however, the investor knows that he will be
forced out of the stock market at some point. The present value of the transaction costs he
expects to pay is therefore lower than in the absence of liquidity shocks. As a result, he is
willing to realize gains sooner.
At higher levels of ρ, however, another factor makes the investor more patient. If he is
holding a stock with a gain, he is reluctant to exit the position because he will then have to
invest the proceeds in another stock, which might do poorly and which he might be forced
7For the case of linear realization utility, the predictions that the investor will be willing to buy stocks
with low expected returns and that he will be risk seeking are robust to changes in the model parameters.
In the next section, however, we will see that when the investor is more sensitive to realized losses than to
realized gains, these predictions do not always hold.
14to sell at a loss by a liquidity shock. This factor pushes the liquidation point back up.
The bottom-right graph shows that as the liquidity shock intensity rises, initial utility
falls. A high intensity ρ makes it more likely that in the near future, the investor will be
forced to exit the stock market with a painful loss.
Several of the implications of realization utility that we have described can also be ob-
tained in a two-period version of our model. However, our inﬁnite horizon framework has
at least one advantage. In an inﬁnite horizon model, the structure of the optimal trading
strategy is simpler than in a two-period model: the investor either holds the risk-free asset
or else buys a series of stocks in sequence, selling each one whenever it reaches a ﬁxed liq-
uidation point. The reason for this simple structure is that in the inﬁnite horizon model,
the environment is stationary: the value function does not depend explicitly on time, t.I n
a two-period model, the environment is non-stationary and so the optimal trading strategy,
while similar to that in our model, has a more complex structure.
We have also studied an extension of our model in which the value of the dividend yield
α, the expected excess capital gain μ, and the standard deviation of returns σ diﬀer across
stocks. In this case, the investor follows a strategy that is similar to the one described
above, but that is restricted to a subset of the available stocks. Speciﬁcally, for each stock
i, the investor computes Vi(W, W), the value function from investing wealth W in stock i
today. Suppose that stock j, with parameter values αj, μj,a n dσj, maximizes Vi(W, W)
across all stocks; and suppose also that there are several stocks, which together comprise a
set M, that have the same parameter values as stock j. Then, so long as Vj(W, W) ≥ 0, the
investor allocates his wealth to a stock drawn from M at time 0, sells it when it reaches the
liquidation point speciﬁed in Proposition 1, and then immediately reinvests the proceeds in
another stock drawn from M,a n ds oo n .
Fig. 2 tells us something about the characteristics of the stocks in the agent’s preferred
set M: a stock is more likely to be in M, the higher its expected excess capital gain μ and
the higher its standard deviation σ. Realization utility therefore has implications not only
for an investor’s selling behavior, but also for his buying behavior.
3. The case of piecewise-linear utility
In Section 2, we took the functional form for realization utility u(·) to be linear. However,
in reality, investors may be more sensitive to realized losses than to realized gains. We





x if x ≥ 0
λx if x<0
, λ>1, (18)
where λ determines the relative sensitivity to realized losses as opposed to realized gains.8
The investor’s decision problem is now
V (Wt,B t)=m a x
τ≥t Et{





−δ(τ−t)[u((1 − k)Wτ − Bτ)+V ((1 − k)Wτ,(1 − k)Wτ)]I{τ<τ }
+ e
−δ(τ −t)u((1 − k)Wτ  − Bτ )I{τ≥τ }}, (19)
subject to (3), (4), (5), and (18). This is the same as decision problem (10) in Section 2
except that u(·) is no longer linear but instead takes the form in (18).
In the Appendix, we prove:
Proposition 2. Unless forced to exit the stock market by a liquidity shock, an investor with
the decision problem in (19) will sell his holdings of a stock if the gain gt = Wt/Bt reaches
a liquidation point gt = g∗ ≥ 1. If the transaction cost k is positive, then g∗ > 1.T h ev a l u e
function is V (Wt,B t)=BtU(gt),w h e r e
U(gt)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨





ρ+δ −μ gt −
ρλ












ρ+δ −μ gt −
ρ





(1 − k)gt(1 + U (1)) − 1i f gt ∈ [g∗,∞)
, (20)





















⎦ < 0, (21)
8It is not clear whether a piecewise-linear form is more reasonable than a linear one. There is, of course,
the well-known concept of “loss aversion,” but this is the idea that people are more sensitive to wealth losses
than to wealth gains, in other words, more sensitive to paper losses than to paper gains. It is the premise
of this paper that utility from realized gains and losses is distinct from utility from paper gains and losses
and that it may have diﬀerent psychological roots. Even if people are more sensitive to paper losses than to
paper gains, it does not necessarily follow that they are also more sensitive to realized losses than to realized
gains.
16and where b, c1, c2,a n dg∗ are determined from
c2 =
(λ − 1)ρ(1 − k)γ2 (μγ1 − ρ − δ )






























kαβ +( 1− k)(μ − δ )
ρ + δ  − μ
g∗ +
δ 
ρ + δ  =( 1− k)g∗
 
b +
ρλ(μ − kρ− kδ )
(ρ + δ )(ρ + δ  − μ)
 
. (25)
Speciﬁcally, given values for the asset-level parameters α, μ, σ,a n dk, and for the investor-
level parameters δ , ρ, λ,a n dβ, we ﬁrst use (22) to ﬁnd c2; we then obtain c1 from (23); we
then use (24) to ﬁnd b; ﬁnally, (25) allows us to solve for the liquidation point g∗.
3.1. Results
The shaded area in the lower graph in Fig. 1 shows the range of values of the expected
excess stock return α + μ and standard deviation of stock returns σ for which the investor
is willing to buy a stock at time 0—in other words, condition (9) is satisﬁed—but also
to sell the stock at a ﬁnite liquidation point. We set the asset-level parameters α and k
to their benchmark values from before, namely 0.015 and 0.005, respectively; and we set
the investor-level parameters δ , ρ,a n dβ to their benchmark values of 0.08, 0.1, and 1,
respectively. Finally, we assign λ the benchmark value of 1.5.
Relative to the upper graph—the graph for the Section 2 model with linear realization
utility—we see that the investor is now more reluctant to invest in a stock with a negative
expected excess return. For a realization utility investor, the problem with investing in such
a stock is that it raises the chance that he will be forced, by a liquidity shock, to make a
painful exit from a losing position. A high sensitivity to losses makes this prospect all the
more unappealing. The investor therefore only invests in a negative expected excess return
stock if it is highly volatile, so that it at least oﬀers a non-negligible chance of a sizeable gain
that he can enjoy realizing.
When λ>1, the prediction that the investor will be willing to invest in a stock with
a negative expected excess return depends heavily on the parameters ρ, λ, and δ . If the
liquidity shock intensity or the sensitivity to losses rise signiﬁcantly above their benchmark
values, or if the discount rate falls signiﬁcantly below its benchmark value, the investor will
no longer be willing to buy a negative expected excess return stock, whatever its volatility.
The graphs in Fig. 4 show how the liquidation point g∗ and initial utility per unit wealth
17U(1) depend on the sensitivity to losses λ. These graphs vary λ while maintaining
(α,μ,σ,k)=( 0 .015,0.015,0.5,0.005)
(δ
 ,ρ,β)=( 0 .08,0.1,1). (26)
In the left graph, we see that the more sensitive the investor is to losses, the higher the
liquidation point: a higher λ means that the investor is more reluctant to sell a stock at a
gain, because if he does, he will have to invest the proceeds in a new stock, which might go
down and which he might be forced to sell at a loss by a liquidity shock. The right graph
shows that, as the sensitivity to losses goes up, initial utility falls: a high λ means that the
investor may be forced, by a liquidity shock, to make an especially painful exit from a losing
position.
The dashed lines in Fig. 2 show how the liquidation point g∗ and initial utility U(1)
depend on μ, σ,a n dδ  when the investor is more sensitive to losses than to gains. Here, we




 ,ρ,λ,β)=( 0 .08,0.1,1.5,1). (27)
By comparing the dashed lines to the solid lines—the lines that correspond to linear realiza-
tion utility—we see that, for our benchmark parameter values, allowing for greater sensitivity
to losses preserves the qualitative relationship between g∗ and U(1) on the one hand, and μ,
σ,a n dδ  on the other.
The dashed line in the middle-right graph of Fig. 2 deserves particular attention. It
shows that, for the benchmark values in (27), initial utility U(1) is still increasing in stock
return volatility σ. Put diﬀerently, even though the functional form for realization utility
is now concave, the investor is still risk seeking. However, when λ>1, this prediction is
sensitive to the values of ρ, λ, and δ . If the sensitivity to losses or the liquidity shock intensity
rise signiﬁcantly, or if the discount rate falls signiﬁcantly, the prediction is reversed: initial
utility becomes a decreasing function of σ and the investor is risk averse, not risk seeking.
It is worth emphasizing the crucial role that the discount rate δ  plays in determining
whether the investor is risk seeking or risk averse, and whether he is willing to buy stocks
with low expected returns. Roughly speaking, buying a stock oﬀers the investor either a
short-term realized gain, should the stock perform well, or a long-term realized loss, should
the stock perform poorly. The more impatient the investor is, the more he focuses on the
18short-term gain as opposed to the long-term loss. As a result, he is more likely to be risk
seeking and to invest in stocks with low expected returns.9
4. An asset pricing model
In Sections 2 and 3, we studied realization utility in a partial equilibrium model of trading
behavior. In this section, we show how it can be embedded in an asset pricing model. We
do not necessarily expect realization utility to have an impact on the prices of all stocks; it
may, at most, aﬀect the prices of stocks held and traded primarily by individual investors.
Of course, the only way to know for sure is to derive the pricing implications of realization
utility and to compare these predictions to the available facts.
Embedding non-standard preferences in a full equilibrium can be challenging. To make
headway, we study the simplest possible model, one with homogeneous realization util-
ity investors. Consider an economy with a risk-free asset and N risky stocks indexed by
i ∈{ 1,...,N}. The risk-free asset is in perfectly elastic supply and earns a continuously




=( r + μi)dt + σidZi,t, (28)
where Zi,t is a Brownian motion and where, for i  = j, dZi,t and dZj,t may be correlated. The
parameters μi and σi are constant over time but can vary across stocks.





where αi will be determined later. By investing in stock i, an investor therefore receives the
dividend stream Di,t, which he consumes, and also the price ﬂuctuation given by
dSi,t
Si,t
=( r + μi)dt + σidZi,t. (30)
The expected excess return of stock i is therefore αi + μi.
The economy contains a continuum of realization utility investors. At each time t ≥ 0,
each investor must either allocate all of his wealth to the risk-free asset or all of his wealth
9We have also studied another extension of the model in Section 2, one that assumes hyperbolic, rather
than exponential, discounting. We ﬁnd that hyperbolic discounting has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the trading
behavior of an investor who is guided by realization utility. The more present-biased the investor is, the
lower the liquidation point: a present-biased investor is impatient to realize gains. More generally, hyperbolic
discounting is one way of thinking about the high discount rate δ required by condition (11).
19to one of the stocks. We allow for transaction costs, liquidity shocks, and piecewise-linear
utility. As noted above, the investors are homogeneous, so that δ , ρ, λ,a n dβ are the same
for all of them. Transaction costs, however, can diﬀer across stocks. The transaction cost
for stock i is ki.
In this economy, the equilibrium conditions are
Vi (W, W)=0 , i =1 ,...,N, (31)
where Vi(Wt,B t) is the value function for an investor whose wealth Wt is allocated to stock i
and whose cost basis is Bt. In words, these conditions mean that an investor who is buying
a stock is indiﬀerent between allocating his wealth to that stock or to the risk-free asset.
Why are Eqs. (31) the appropriate equilibrium conditions? Note that, under the con-
ditions in (31), we can clear markets at time 0 by assigning some investors to each stock
and the rest to the risk-free asset. If, at any point in the future, some investors sell their
holdings of stock i because of a liquidity shock, they immediately withdraw from the asset
markets. If some investors sell their holdings of stock i because, for these investors, the stock
has reached its liquidation point, the conditions in (31) mean that they are happy to then
be assigned to the risk-free asset. Finally, the conditions in (31) mean that, if some investors
do sell their holdings of stock i, whether because of a liquidity shock or because the stock
reaches its liquidation point, we can reassign other investors from the risk-free asset to stock
i, thereby again clearing the market in this stock.10
Formally, the decision problem for an investor holding stock i at time t is
Vi (Wt,B t)=m a x
τ≥t Et{





−δ(τ−t)u((1 − ki)Wτ − Bτ)I{τ<τ } + e
−δ(τ −t)u((1 − ki)Wτ  − Bτ )I{τ≥τ }},
subject to (3), (5), (18), and
dWs
Ws
=( r + μi)ds + σidZi,s, t ≤ s<min{τ,τ
 }, (33)
where τ  is the random future time at which a liquidity shock arrives. This diﬀers from the
decision problem in (19) in that it imposes the market clearing condition (31): after selling
his stock holdings at time τ, the investor’s future value function is zero. We summarize the
10We assume here that whenever we need to reassign investors from the risk-free asset to one of the stocks,
there are always enough investors holding the risk-free asset to make this possible. This can happen if, for
example, investors who leave the asset markets because of a liquidity shock later re-enter.
20solution to the decision problem in (32) in the following proposition. The proof is in the
Appendix.
Proposition 3. Unless forced to exit the stock market by a liquidity shock, an investor with
the decision problem in (32) will sell his holdings of a stock if the gain gt = Wt/Bt reaches
a liquidation point gt = g∗ ≥ 1. If the transaction cost ki is positive, then g∗ > 1.T h ev a l u e
function when holding stock i at time t is Vi(Wt,B t)=BtUi(gt),w h e r e
Ui(gt)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
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⎦ < 0, (36)
and where b, c1, c2,a n dg∗ are determined from
c2 =
(λ − 1)ρ(1 − ki)γ2 (μiγ1 − ρ − δ )































(1 − ki)(μi − δ  − ρλ)
ρ + δ  − μi
+
ρλ




ρ + δ . (40)
The equilibrium expected excess return of stock i is αi + μi. The parameter μi is the
expected excess dividend growth rate and is exogeneously given. To determine αi,w er e q u i r e
that the value function satisﬁes the condition in (31), namely Vi(W, W) = 0, or equivalently,
Ui(1) = 0. The parameter αi is therefore given by
b +
αiβ + ρλ(1 − ki)
ρ + δ  − μi
−
ρλ
ρ + δ  = 0. (41)
Since the parameters δ , ρ, λ,a n dβ are constant across investors, αi is constant over time,
as assumed earlier.11
11In our model, it is the buyers of the risky assets, not the sellers, who set prices. In other words, the
21In Section 5.2, we use the model described in this section to illustrate the eﬀect of
realization utility on asset prices. We emphasize that conditions (31) only describe an
equilibrium when all investors in the economy have the same realization utility preferences.
They do not describe an equilibrium when investors have heterogeneous realization utility
preferences, nor when some investors have expected utility preferences deﬁned only over
consumption. We conjecture that in an economy with both expected utility and realization
utility investors, the expected utility investors will partially—but only partially – attenuate
any pricing eﬀects caused by realization utility investors. The predictions of the model in
this section should therefore hold more strongly among stocks traded by investors whose
thinking is especially inﬂuenced by realization utility.
5. Applications
Our model may be able to shed light on a number of ﬁnancial phenomena. We now discuss
some of these potential applications. We divide the applications into those that relate to
trading behavior (Section 5.1) and those that relate to asset prices (Section 5.2). In Section
5.3, we brieﬂy discuss a few of the testable predictions that emerge from our framework.
5.1. Trading behavior
5.1.1. The disposition eﬀect
The disposition eﬀect is the ﬁnding that individual investors have a greater propensity to
sell stocks that have gone up in value since purchase, rather than stocks that have gone down
in value (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998). This fact has turned out to be some-
thing of a puzzle, in that the most obvious potential explanations fail to capture important
features of the data. Consider, for example, the most obvious potential explanation of all,
the “informed trading” hypothesis. Under this view, investors sell stocks that have gone up
in value because they have private information that these stocks will subsequently fall, and
they hold on to stocks that have gone down in value because they have private information
that these stocks will rebound. The diﬃculty with this view, as Odean (1998) points out, is
that the prior winners people sell subsequently do better, on average, than the prior losers
condition Vi(W,W) = 0 is determined by buyer behavior, not seller behavior. To see this, suppose that an
investor is trying to sell stock i.I fVi(W,W) > 0, then all investors holding the risk-free asset will want to
switch to the stock and the market will fail to clear. On the other hand, if Vi(W,W) < 0, there will be no
one for the seller to trade with: no one holding the risk-free asset will want to switch to the stock. Only if
Vi(W,W) = 0 can we clear the market. The fact that prices are set by buyers has an important corollary: it
means that the price of a stock does not depend on the average cost basis of the investors holding it.
22they hold on to. Odean (1998) also considers other potential explanations based on taxes,
rebalancing, and transaction costs, but argues that none of them is fully satisfactory.
Our analysis shows that a model that combines realization utility with a suﬃciently
positive time discount rate predicts a strong disposition eﬀect. Unless forced to sell at a loss
by a liquidity shock, the investor in our model only sells stocks trading at a price higher
than the original purchase price.
In simple two-period settings, Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Barberis and Xiong (2009)
show that realization utility, with no time discounting but with a functional form for utility
that, as in prospect theory, is concave over gains and convex over losses, can predict a
disposition eﬀect. This paper proposes a related but distinct view of the disposition eﬀect,
namely that it arises from realization utility with a linear functional form for utility and a
positive time discount rate.
We emphasize that realization utility does not, on its own, predict a disposition eﬀect.
In other words, to generate a disposition eﬀect, it is not enough to assume that the investor
derives pleasure from realizing a gain and pain from realizing a loss. We need an extra
ingredient in order to explain why the investor would want to realize a gain today,r a t h e r
than hold out for the chance of realizing an even bigger gain tomorrow. Shefrin and Statman
(1985) and Barberis and Xiong (2009) point out one possible extra ingredient: a prospect
theory functional form for utility. Such a functional form indeed explains why the investor
would expedite realizing a gain and postpone realizing a loss. Here, we propose an alternative
extra ingredient: a suﬃciently positive time discount rate.
Our model is also well-suited for thinking about the disposition-type eﬀects that have been
uncovered in other settings. Genesove and Mayer (2001), for example, ﬁnd that homeowners
are reluctant to sell their houses at prices below the original purchase price. Our analysis
shows that a model that combines linear realization utility with a positive time discount rate
can capture this evidence.
Of all the applications we discuss in Section 5, the disposition eﬀect is the most obvious,
in the sense that it is very clear how the eﬀect follows from our initial assumptions. However,
as we noted in the Introduction, realization utility is in no sense a relabeling of the disposition
eﬀect. On the contrary, it is just one of a number of possible theories of the disposition eﬀect,
and can be distinguished from other theories through carefully constructed tests.
An example of a test that distinguishes various theories of the disposition eﬀect can be
found in Weber and Camerer (1998). These authors test the realization utility view of the
disposition eﬀect against the alternative view that it stems from an irrational belief in mean-
23reversion. In a laboratory setting, they ask subjects to trade six stocks over a number of
periods. In each period, each stock can either go up or down. The six stocks have diﬀerent
probabilities of going up in any period, ranging from 0.35 to 0.65, but subjects are not told
which stock is associated with each possible up-move probability.
Weber and Camerer (1998) ﬁnd that, just as in ﬁeld data, their subjects exhibit a dispo-
sition eﬀect. To try to understand the source of the eﬀect, the authors consider an additional
experimental condition in which the experimenter liquidates subjects’ holdings and then tells
them that they are free to reinvest the proceeds in any way they like. If subjects were holding
on to their losing stocks because they thought that these stocks would rebound, we would
expect them to re-establish their positions in these losing stocks. In fact, subjects do not
re-establish these positions. This casts doubt on the mean-reversion view of the disposition
eﬀect and lends support to the realization utility view, namely that subjects were refusing
to sell their losers simply because it would have been painful to do so. Under this view,
subjects were relieved when the experimenter intervened and did it for them.12
5.1.2. Excessive trading
Using a database of trading activity at a large discount brokerage ﬁrm, Barber and Odean
(2000) show that, after transaction costs, the average return of the individual investors in
their sample falls below the returns on a range of benchmarks. This is puzzling: why do
people trade so much if their trading hurts their performance? Barber and Odean (2000)
consider a number of potential explanations, including taxes, rebalancing, and liquidity
needs, but conclude that none of them can fully explain the patterns they observe.
Our model oﬀers an explanation for this post-transaction-cost underperformance. Under
this view, the investors in Barber and Odean’s (2000) sample are guided by realization utility.
This leads them to trade: speciﬁcally, to sell stocks that have risen in value since purchase
so that they can enjoy bursts of positive utility, and to then invest the proceeds in new
stocks. However, by trading, they incur transaction costs that cause them to underperform
the benchmarks.
It is possible to compute the probability that the investor in our model sells a stock within
any given interval of time after the initial purchase. Doing so will help us compare the trading
frequency predicted by our model with that observed in actual brokerage accounts. When
the investor ﬁrst establishes a position in a stock, at time 0, say, we have g0 =1 . W h e n
gt reaches an upper barrier g∗ > 1 or when a liquidity shock arrives, he sells the stock. To
12See Kaustia (2010) for additional evidence against the mean-reversion view of the disposition eﬀect.
24compute the probability that the investor sells the stock within s periods after establishing
the position, we therefore need to compute the probability that gt reaches g∗ in the interval
(0,s) or that there is a liquidity shock during the same interval. The next proposition, which
we prove in the Appendix, reports the result of this calculation.






































The expression in the square parentheses in (42) is the probability that gt reaches g∗ in
the interval (0,s). With this information in hand, it is easy to interpret the equation. The
investor trades during the interval (0,s) if one of two mutually exclusive events occurs: if
there is a liquidity shock in (0,s); or if there is no liquidity shock in (0,s) but gt reaches g∗
in (0,s). The probability of a trade in (0,s) is therefore the probability of a liquidity shock
in (0,s), namely 1−e−ρs, plus the probability of no liquidity shock, namely e−ρs, multiplied
by the probability that gt reaches g∗.
Fig. 5 shows how the probability of selling a stock within a year of purchase, G(1),
depends on the model parameters. To construct the graphs, we use the model of Section 3
which allows for a transaction cost, a liquidity shock, and piecewise-linear utility. For any
given parameter values, we compute the liquidation point g∗ from (22)–(25) and substitute
the result into the expression for G(1) in Proposition 4. The graphs vary each of μ, σ, δ , k,
and λ in turn, keeping the remaining parameters ﬁxed at their benchmark values
(α,μ,σ,k)=( 0 .015,0.015,0.5,0.005)
(δ
 ,ρ,λ,β)=( 0 .08,0.1,1.5,1). (43)
Some of the results in Fig. 5 are not very surprising. The middle-left graph shows that as
the investor becomes more impatient, the probability of a trade rises. And the middle-right
graph shows that as the transaction cost falls, the probability of a trade again rises.
The top-left and top-right graphs, which vary μ and σ respectively, are less predictable.
In both cases, there are two factors at work. On the one hand, for any ﬁxed liquidation
point g∗,ah i g h e rμ or σ raises the likelihood that g∗ will be reached within the year-long
interval. However, as we saw in Fig. 2, the liquidation point g∗ itself goes up as μ and σ go
25up, thereby lowering the chance that g∗ will be reached. Without computing G(1) explicitly,
it is hard to know which factor will dominate.
The top graphs in Fig. 5 show that, interestingly, a diﬀerent factor dominates in each case.
As μ rises, the probability of a trade falls. Roughly speaking, as μ rises, the liquidation point
rises more quickly than the stock’s ability to reach it. As σ rises, however, the probability of
a trade goes up: in this case, the liquidation point rises less quickly than the stock’s ability
to reach it.
The bottom-left graph, which varies λ, shows that the probability of a trade declines as
the sensitivity to losses rises. If λ is high, the investor is reluctant to sell a stock trading at
a gain because if he does, he will have to buy a new stock, which might go down and which
he might be forced to sell at a loss by a liquidity shock.
Barber and Odean (2000) ﬁnd that in their sample of households with brokerage accounts,
the mean and median annual turnover rates are 75% and 30%, respectively. Fig. 5 shows
that for the benchmark parameter values, our model predicts a trading frequency that is of
a similar order of magnitude. When σ =0 .5, for example, the probability that an investor
trades a speciﬁc stock in his portfolio within a year of purchase is approximately 0.6. Of
course, the fact that the trading frequency predicted by our model is similar to that observed
in actual brokerage accounts is not an accident: we chose the benchmark value of δ  to ensure
that this would be the case.
When we say that realization utility can help us understand “excessive trading,” we do
not mean that it can explain the high overall volume of trading in ﬁnancial markets. Rather,
we mean something narrower: that it can help us understand why individual investors trade
as much as they do in their brokerage accounts, given that they would earn higher returns, on
average, if they traded less. While realization utility investors are keen to trade a stock that
has risen in value, they are not keen to trade a stock that has fallen in value. It is therefore
an open question as to whether an increase in the fraction of investors in the economy who
are guided by realization utility would lead to an increase in the overall volume of trading.
5.1.3. Underperformance before transaction costs
Some studies ﬁnd that the average individual investor underperforms benchmarks even
before transaction costs (Barber et al., 2009). Our model may be able to shed light on this by
way of one of the predictions we discussed in Sections 2 and 3: that an investor who thinks
in terms of realization utility is often willing to buy a stock with a low expected return, so
long as the stock’s volatility is suﬃciently high.
Suppose that the investing population consists of two groups: individuals, who think in
26terms of realization utility; and institutions, who do not. Since individuals are guided by
realization utility, they may be more willing than institutions to buy stocks with low ex-
pected returns. Moreover, since the average portfolio return before transaction costs across
all investors must equal the market return, we should observe the average individual under-
performing market benchmarks before transaction costs and the average institution outper-
forming the benchmarks, again before transaction costs. This prediction is broadly consistent
with the available evidence.13
5.1.4. Trading volume in rising and falling markets
Researchers have found that in many diﬀerent asset classes, trading volume is higher in
rising markets than in falling markets (Stein, 1995; Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink, 2006;
Griﬃn, Nardari, and Stulz, 2007). Robust though this ﬁnding is, there are few explanations
for it. The equilibrium model of Section 4 oﬀers a way of understanding it. In that model,
there is indeed more trading in rising markets. In a rising market, the stocks held by
realization utility investors start hitting their liquidation points. When this happens, these
investors sell their stocks to other realization utility investors. As a result, trading volume
goes up.
The same line of reasoning can motivate the use of turnover as a measure of investor
sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). If some investors have very positive sentiment and
push stock prices up as a result, realization utility investors will start trading heavily. This
creates a link between turnover and sentiment.
5.1.5. The eﬀect of historical highs on the propensity to sell
Our model implies that there will be more trading in rising markets, but it can also make
more precise predictions as to how trading activity will vary over time. For example, it
predicts that individual investors—the investor group that is more likely to think in terms
of realization utility—will have a much higher propensity to sell a stock once its price moves
above its historical high.
13So far, our model has pointed to two ways in which realization utility can lower an investor’s Sharpe ratio:
it leads him to buy stocks with low expected returns and high volatility; and by encouraging him to trade, it
leads him to incur transaction costs. There is one more channel through which realization utility can harm
the investor’s performance—a channel that, while important, lies outside our model. A strategy that sells
winners but holds on to losers will lower the investor’s average return if his typical holding period coincides
with the horizon at which stocks exhibit momentum. At least for some investors, this does appear to be
the case: the investors in Barber and Odean’s (2000) sample hold stocks for a few months, on average—a
horizon at which stock returns exhibit signiﬁcant momentum.
27To see this, consider a stock that, on January 1st, is trading at $30. Suppose that it
then rises through January and February, reaching a high of $45 by February 28th. It then
declines signiﬁcantly through most of March but, towards the end of March, starts rising
again, passing through the previous high of $45 on March 31st and continuing upwards.
Our model predicts that after the stock passes $45 on March 31st, there will be a sharp
increase in selling by individual investors. To see why, note that there will be very little
selling between February 28th and March 31st. During this time, the stock is trading below
its high of $45. The only investors who would want to sell in this interval are those targeting
liquidation points below $45. But the majority of these investors will have sold the stock
already, before February 28th, when the stock ﬁrst reached $45. Once the stock moves above
$45 on March 31st, however, investors targeting liquidation points higher than $45 will start
selling. As claimed above, then, individual investors’ propensity to sell a stock will increase
sharply as the stock price moves above its historical high.
Our prediction is consistent with the available evidence. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)
ﬁnd that households’ propensity to sell a stock does increase strongly once the stock price
moves above its historical high for that month. Similarly, albeit in a diﬀerent context, Heath,
Huddart, and Lang (1999) ﬁnd that executives are much more likely to exercise stock options
when the underlying stock price exceeds its historical high. Finally, Baker, Pan, and Wurgler
(2009) show that, when a ﬁrm makes a takeover bid for another ﬁrm, the oﬀer price is more
likely to slightly exceed the target’s 52-week historical high than to be slightly below it;
and that there is a discontinuous increase in deal success as the oﬀer price rises through the
52-week high. This is consistent with the idea that, as a consequence of realization utility,
investors are more likely to sell their shares in the target company at a price that exceeds
the historical high.14
5.1.6. The individual investor preference for volatile stocks
Kumar (2009) analyzes the trades of approximately 60,000 households with accounts at
a large discount brokerage ﬁrm. He ﬁnds that, as a group, the individual investors in his
sample overweight highly volatile stocks: these stocks make up a larger fraction of the value
14It is tempting to interpret Grinblatt and Keloharju’s (2001) ﬁnding as evidence that investors use the
historical high as an explicit reference point: for example, that they derive utility from the diﬀerence between
the price at which they sell a stock and its historical high. Our analysis shows, however, that Grinblatt and
Keloharju’s (2001) result can arise in a model in which the only explicit reference point is the purchase
price. The historical high emerges as a reference point endogeneously because of the nature of the investor’s
optimal strategy.
28of the aggregate individual investor portfolio, constructed using these data, than they do of
the aggregate market portfolio. Realization utility oﬀers a way of understanding this. As we
saw in Sections 2 and 3, investors who are guided by realization utility often have a strong
preference for volatile stocks. Moreover, these investors are more likely to be individuals
than institutions.
5.2. Asset pricing
Our model may also be helpful for understanding certain asset pricing patterns. We now
discuss three applications of this type.
5.2.1. The low average return of volatile stocks
Ang et al. (2006) show that, in the cross-section, and after controlling for previously
known predictor variables, a stock’s daily return volatility over the previous month negatively
predicts its return in the following month. This ﬁnding, which holds not only in the U.S.
stock market but in many international stock markets as well, is puzzling. Even if we allow
ourselves to think of a stock’s own volatility as risk, the result is the opposite of what we
would expect: it says that “riskier” stocks have lower average returns.
Our model oﬀers a novel explanation for this ﬁnding. We noted earlier—see the middle-
right graph in Fig. 2—that for some parameter values, realization utility investors are risk
seeking. As a result, they will exert heavy buying pressure on stocks that are highly volatile.
These stocks may then become overpriced. If so, their subsequent average return will indeed
be low.
We now check this intuition using the equilibrium model of Section 4. We assign all
investors the same benchmark parameter values
(δ
 ,ρ,λ,β)=( 0 .08,0.1,1.5,1), (44)
and assume that the excess dividend growth rate and the transaction cost are the same for
all stocks, namely μ = −0.03 and k =0 .005, respectively. For values of σ ranging from 0.01
to 0.5, we use equilibrium condition (41) to compute the dividend yield α and hence the
expected excess return α + μ that a stock with any given standard deviation must earn in
order for its market to clear.15
15Since μ is the excess dividend growth rate, a negative value of μ does not necessarily mean that the
dividend growth rate is negative, just that it is below the risk-free rate. Since, for the parameter values in
(44), the investors in our economy are risk seeking, the dividend growth rate must be below the risk-free rate
to prevent prices from exploding, just as, in a standard Gordon growth model with risk-neutral investors,
29The top-left graph in Fig. 6 plots the resulting relationship between standard deviation
and expected excess return. The graph conﬁrms our prediction: more volatile stocks earn
lower average returns; in this sense, they are overpriced.16
The top-left graph also shows that for the parameter values in (44), stocks earn negative
average excess returns, which is inconsistent with the positive historical equity premium. A
negative equity premium is not a generic prediction of our model: for values of ρ and λ that
are somewhat higher than those in (44), and for values of δ  that are somewhat lower, the
investors become risk averse rather than risk seeking and the equity premium turns positive.
It is diﬃcult, however, for the homogeneous agent economy we are analyzing to generate
both a positive equity premium and a negative relationship between volatility and average
return in the cross-section. We conjecture that it may be possible to generate both of these
facts in an economy with heterogeneous realization utility investors, some of whom are risk
seeking and some of whom are risk averse.
Another way of reconciling the top-left graph with the positive historical equity premium
is to say that the result in the graph only applies to stocks that are primarily held by investors
who think in terms of realization utility—most likely, individual investors. Since these stocks
constitute a small fraction of the total stock market capitalization, they play only a minor
role in determining the aggregate equity premium. One prediction of this view is that the
cross-sectional relationship between volatility and average return documented by Ang et al.
(2006) should be stronger among stocks traded by individual investors. This is exactly the
ﬁnding of Han and Kumar (2011).
5.2.2. The heavy trading of highly valued assets
A robust empirical ﬁnding is that assets that are highly valued, and possibly overvalued,
are also heavily traded (Hong and Stein, 2007). Growth stocks, for example, are more heavily
traded than value stocks; the highly priced technology stocks of the late 1990s changed hands
at a rapid pace; and shares at the center of famous bubble episodes, such as those of the
East India Company at the time of the South Sea bubble, also experienced heavy trading.
Our model may be able to explain this coincidence of high prices and heavy trading.
the dividend growth rate has to be below the risk-free rate. Note that a negative excess dividend growth
rate μ does not necessarily imply a negative expected excess return. The expected excess return is α + μ.
This can be positive even if μ is negative.
16In our model, the risky assets are inﬁnitely lived. We have studied a variant of the model in which the
risky assets stochastically “expire” based on the arrival of Poisson-distributed liquidation shocks. We ﬁnd
that in an economy with realization utility investors, a short-horizon asset—one with a higher liquidation
shock intensity—can earn a higher Sharpe ratio than a long-horizon asset.
30Speciﬁcally, it predicts that this phenomenon will occur for assets whose value is especially
uncertain.
Suppose that the uncertainty about an asset’s value goes up, thereby increasing σ,t h e
standard deviation of returns. As noted earlier, investors who think in terms of realization
utility will now ﬁnd the asset more attractive. If there are many such investors in the
economy, the asset’s price will be pushed up.
At the same time, the top-right graph in Fig. 5 shows that as σ goes up, the probability
that an investor will trade the asset also goes up: simply put, a more volatile asset tends to
reach its liquidation point more rapidly. In this sense, the overvaluation will coincide with
higher turnover, and this will occur when uncertainty about the asset’s value is especially
high. Under this view, the late 1990s were years when realization utility investors, attracted
by the high uncertainty of technology stocks, bought these stocks, pushing their prices up;
as (some of) these stocks rapidly reached their liquidation points, the realization utility
investors sold them and then immediately bought new ones.
We now check this intuition using the equilibrium framework of Section 4. As in our
discussion of the low average return of volatile stocks, we assign all investors the benchmark
parameter values in (44) and assume that the excess dividend growth rate and the transaction
cost are the same for all stocks, namely μ = −0.03 and k =0 .005, respectively. For values
of σ ranging from 0.01 to 0.5, we again use condition (41) to compute the corresponding
equilibrium expected excess return; but this time, as a guide to the intensity of trading, we
also use (42) to compute G(1), the probability of a trade within a year of purchase.
The top-right graph in Fig. 6 plots the resulting relationship between the expected excess
return and the trade probability. It conﬁrms that stocks with lower expected returns—stocks
that are more “overpriced”—do indeed experience more turnover.
5.2.3. Momentum
Grinblatt and Han (2005) study an economy in which some investors’ demand for a
stock depends, negatively, on the diﬀerence between the current stock price and the price
they paid for the stock. They show that in this economy, as in actual data, stock returns
exhibit momentum. The authors suggest one possible foundation for the demand function
they propose, namely, a combination of prospect theory and mental accounting. Our model
suggests a diﬀerent, albeit related foundation: linear realization utility. In combination with
a suﬃciently positive time discount rate, linear realization utility also leads to a demand
function for a stock that depends, negatively, on the diﬀerence between the current stock
price and the purchase price. This, in turn, suggests that momentum may ultimately stem,
31at least in part, from realization utility.
A limitation of the pricing model in Section 4 is that it does not allow us to illustrate
the link between realization utility and momentum: in that model, stock returns are not
predictable. To see why the link breaks down, recall the original intuition for it. The idea
is that if a stock rises in value, realization utility investors will start selling it in order to
realize a gain. This selling pressure causes the stock to become undervalued. Subsequently,
the stock price moves higher, on average, as it corrects from this undervalued point to a more
reasonable valuation. An upward price move is therefore followed by another upward price
move, on average. This generates a momentum eﬀect in the cross-section of stock returns.
In our model, realization utility investors do indeed start selling when a stock rises in
value. However, this does not depress the stock price because of the perfectly elastic demand
for the stock from other realization utility investors. As a result, there is no momentum.
We suspect that the link between realization utility and momentum can be formalized in an
economy with both realization utility investors and expected utility investors. In such an
economy, when realization utility investors sell a stock that is rising in value, their selling
will depress the stock price because the demand from expected utility investors will not be
perfectly elastic.
5.3. Testable predictions
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we argue that realization utility oﬀers a simple way of under-
standing a range of ﬁnancial phenomena. In this section, we brieﬂy note a few of the new
predictions that emerge from our framework.
One set of predictions is based on the graphs in Fig. 5, which show how the probability
of trade depends on various parameters. One of these predictions, that the investor is more
likely to trade a stock within a year of purchase when transaction costs are lower, is not unique
to our model. However, the ﬁgure also suggests some other, more novel predictions: that the
probability that the investor trades a stock within a year of purchase is an increasing function
of his impatience and of the stock’s volatility, and a decreasing function of his sensitivity to
losses.
The prediction relating the probability of trade to a stock’s volatility is straightforward
to test empirically. To test the predicted link between trade probability and impatience
and between trade probability and sensitivity to losses, we need estimates of impatience
and loss sensitivity, which may be diﬃcult to obtain. In recent years, however, researchers
have pioneered clever techniques for extracting information about investors’ psychological
proﬁles. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), for example, use military test scores from Finland
32to estimate overconﬁdence. This success makes us more optimistic that a test of the link
between trade probability on the one hand, and impatience and loss sensitivity on the other,
can also be implemented.
If we are indeed able to measure investor impatience, there are other predictions that can
be tested. As noted earlier, two of the more striking implications of realization utility—that
investors will be willing to buy stocks that are highly volatile and that have low expected
returns—depend crucially on the discount rate δ. Roughly speaking, a stock with a low
expected return or with high volatility oﬀers the investor the prospect of realizing either a
short-term gain or a long-term loss. The higher the discount rate δ, the more attractive
this tradeoﬀ becomes. In short, then, if we are able to measure investor impatience, we
should ﬁnd that more impatient investors allocate more to stocks with low expected returns,
thereby earning low portfolio returns even before taking transaction costs into account; and
also that they tilt their portfolios more heavily towards volatile stocks.
6. Conclusion
A number of authors have suggested that investors may derive utility from realizing gains
and losses. We present a model of this “realization utility,” study its predictions, and show
that it can shed light on a number of puzzling facts.
There are several possible directions for future research. First, while many of our model’s
implications match the observed facts, some do not. For example, our model predicts too
strong a disposition eﬀect: in our framework, investors never voluntarily sell stocks at a
loss, while, in reality, they clearly do. It would be useful to see whether an extension of our
model—one that modiﬁes our preference speciﬁcation in some way, or that allows for richer
beliefs about expected stock returns—can make more accurate predictions.17
Another natural research direction involves testing the implications of realization utility.
To do this, we can use ﬁeld data on investor trading behavior; or experimental data, as
in Weber and Camerer (1998). Another type of data that has recently become available is
neural data. For example, Frydman et al. (2011) use functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) technology to monitor the brain activity of 28 subjects while they trade stocks in
an experimental market. The authors use the neural data to test some theories of investor
behavior, including the one presented in this paper.
Finally, it would be useful to think about other applications of realization utility. These
applications may again concern the trading and pricing of ﬁnancial securities, or they may be
17Two recent studies that take up this question are Ingersoll and Jin (2011) and Henderson (2012).
33drawn from quite diﬀerent areas of study. After all, the core idea that, in our view, underlies
realization utility—that people break their experiences down into episodes and receive a
burst of utility when an episode comes to an end—strikes us as one that may be relevant in
many contexts, not just the ﬁnancial market context that we have focused on in this paper.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. At time t, the investor can either liquidate his position or hold
it for an inﬁnitesimal period dt. We therefore have
V (Wt,B t)
=m a x {u((1 − k)Wt − Bt)+V ((1 − k)Wt,(1 − k)Wt), (45)
v(Di,t)dt +( 1− ρdt)Et[e
−δdtV (Wt+dt,B t+dt)] + ρdt[u((1 − k)Wt − Bt)]}.
The ﬁrst argument of the “max” function corresponds to the case where the investor
liquidates his position at time t: he receives realization utility of u((1 − k)Wt − Bt)a n d
cash proceeds of (1 − k)Wt which he immediately invests in another stock. The second
argument of the “max” function corresponds to the case where the investor instead holds his
position for an inﬁnitesimal period dt: he receives utility v(Di,t)dt from the ﬂow of dividends;
with probability e−ρdt ≈ 1 − ρdt, there is no liquidity shock during the interval and his
value function is the expected future value function discounted back; and with probability
1−e−ρdt ≈ ρdt,t h e r eis a liquidity shock, in which case he sells his holdings, exits the asset
markets, and receives realization utility of u((1 − k)Wt − Bt).
Given the homogeneity property in (8), we can write the value function as
V (Wt,B t)=BtU (gt).
Substituting this into (45), cancelling Bt from both sides, and applying Ito’s lemma gives










   (gt)+μgtU
  (gt) − (ρ + δ
 )U (gt)+ρu((1 − k)gt − 1)
 
dt}.
Eq. (46) implies that any solution to (10) must satisfy









   (gt)+μgtU
  (gt) − (ρ + δ
 )U (gt)+ρu((1 − k)gt − 1) ≤ 0. (48)
34Formally speaking, the decision problem in (10) is an optimal stopping problem. To solve
it, we ﬁrst construct a function U(gt) that satisﬁes conditions (47) and (48) and that is both
continuous and continuously diﬀerentiable—this last condition is sometimes known as the
“smooth pasting” condition. If we are able to do this, then, given that certain technical
conditions are satisﬁed, the constructed function U(gt) will indeed be a solution to problem
(10).
We construct U(gt) in the following way. If gt is low, speciﬁcally, if gt ∈ (0,g ∗), we
suppose that the investor continues to hold his current position. In this “continuation”
region, condition (48) holds with equality. If gt is suﬃciently high, speciﬁcally, if gt ∈ (g∗,∞),
we suppose that the investor liquidates his position. In this “liquidation” region, condition
(47) holds with equality. As in the statement of the proposition, we refer to g∗ as the
liquidation point.







   (gt)+μgtU
  (gt) − (ρ + δ
 )U (gt)+( αβ + ρ(1 − k))gt − ρ =0 .




αβ + ρ(1 − k)
ρ + δ  − μ
gt −
ρ
ρ + δ  for gt ∈ (0,g ∗), (49)
where γ1 is given in (15) and where a is determined below.
In the liquidation region, we have
U (gt)=( 1− k)gt(1 + U (1)) − 1. (50)
Note that the liquidation point g∗ satisﬁes g∗ ≥ 1. For if g∗ < 1, then gt =1w o u l df a l li n t o
the liquidation region, which, from (50), would imply
U(1) = (1 − k)U(1) − k.
For k>0a n dU(1) ≥ 0, this is a contradiction. Since g∗ ≥ 1, then, we infer from (49) that
U(1) = a +
αβ + ρ(1 − k)
ρ + δ  − μ
−
ρ
ρ + δ . (51)
The value function must be continuous and continuously diﬀerentiable at the liquidation
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αβ + ρ(1 − k)
ρ + δ  − μ
=( 1 − k)(1 + U (1)).
35Solving these two equations, we obtain the expression for a in (16) and the nonlinear equation
for g∗ in (17). It is straightforward to check that if restriction (11) holds, Eq. (17) has a
unique solution in the range (1,∞).
We now verify that the function U(gt) summarized in Eq. (14) satisﬁes conditions (47)
and (48). Deﬁne
f (g) ≡ (1 − k)(1 + U (1))g − 1.
By construction, f (g) is a straight line that coincides with U (g)f o rg ≥ g∗.S i n c eγ1 > 1—
this follows from μ<ρ+δ  which, in turn, follows from restriction (11)—U(g) in Eq. (14) is
a convex function. It must therefore lie above the straight line f(g) for all g<g ∗. Condition
(47) is therefore satisﬁed.
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For g<g ∗,H(g) = 0 by construction. For g ≥ g∗,U(g)=f (g), so that
H (g)=−(1 − k)g
 
(ρ + δ







Substituting (51) and (16) into this expression, we obtain
H (g)=−(1 − k)g
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(ρ + δ )(γ1 − 1)
(ρ + δ
  − μγ1).
The last equality follows by applying (17). Using (15), it is straightforward to show that if
μ<ρ+ δ , as assumed in restriction (11), then ρ + δ  − μγ1 > 0. Therefore, H (g) < 0f o r
g ≥ g∗, thereby conﬁrming that condition (48) holds for all gt ∈ (0,∞).
To formally complete the derivation of Proposition 1, we have proved a veriﬁcation the-
orem. This theorem uses the fact that conditions (47) and (48) hold everywhere to conﬁrm
that the stopping strategy proposed above is indeed the optimal one. For space reasons, we
do not present the details of this step here.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is very similar in structure to the proof of Proposition
1. We therefore present only the key steps. From (8), the value function takes the form
V (Wt,B t)=BtU (gt).
36Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, we ﬁnd that U(·) again
satisﬁes Eq. (46) and inequalities (47) and (48). The only diﬀerence is that u(·)n o wh a s
the piecewise-linear form in (18).
As before, we conjecture two regions: a continuation region, gt ∈ (0,g ∗), and a liquidation







   (gt)+μgtU
  (gt) − (ρ + δ
 )U (gt)+αβgt + ρu((1 − k)gt − 1) = 0. (52)
The form of the u(·) term depends on whether its argument, (1 −k)gt −1, is greater or less
than zero. Note that the cross-over point, gt =
1
1−k, lies below g∗, so that g∗ ≥
1
1−k.F o ri f
g∗ < 1
1−k,t h e ngt = 1






contradicting the reasonable restriction that U(gt) be strictly increasing in gt.S i n c e g∗ ≥
1
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and where c1 and c2 are determined below.
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.
Together, these equations imply Eq. (22).
In the liquidation region, gt ∈ (g∗,∞), using the fact that g∗ ≥ 1, we have
U (gt)=( 1− k)gt(1 + U (1)) − 1.







αβ + ρ(1 − k)
ρ + δ  − μ
g∗ =( 1 − k)g∗(1 + U (1)) −
δ 






αβ + ρ(1 − k)
ρ + δ  − μ
=( 1 − k)(1 + U (1)).
Since, from (53),
U(1) = b +
αβ
ρ + δ  − μ
+
ρλ(μ − kρ− kδ )
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,
which reduces to Eq. (25); and also Eq. (23).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .We solve the decision problem in (32) using the same technique
as the one employed in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. In particular, we replace α, μ,
σ,a n dk in (46) with αi , μi, σi,a n dki—the dividend yield, expected excess capital gain,
standard deviation, and transaction cost of stock i, respectively. We also note that Ui (1) = 0
in equilibrium. It is then straightforward to obtain the results in Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. Deﬁne xt ≡ lngt and x∗ ≡ lng∗. Then,




38If the investor has not yet traded, what is the probability that he trades at least once
in the following s periods? Note that he will trade if the stock price rises suﬃciently high
so that the process xt hits the barrier x∗; or if there is a liquidity shock. The probability is
therefore a function of xt and of the length of the period s.W ed e n o t ei tb yp(x,s).
Since a probability process is a martingale, its drift is zero, so that




2pxx + ρ(1 − p)=0 .
The last term on the left-hand side is generated by the liquidity shock: if a liquidity shock
arrives, the probability of a trade jumps from p to 1. The probability function must also
satisfy two boundary conditions. First, if the process xt is already at the barrier x∗,t h e r ei s
a trade for sure:
p(x∗,s)=1 , ∀s ≥ 0.
Second, if the length of the remaining time period is zero and the price level is such that
x<x ∗, there will be no trade:
p(x,0) = 0, ∀x<x ∗.























Substituting x =0 ,x ∗ =l ng∗, and μx = μ − σ2
2 into this expression, we obtain the result in
Proposition 4.
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Fig. 1. Range of values of a stock’s expected excess return and standard deviation for
which an investor who derives utility from realized gains and losses is willing both to buy
the stock and to sell it once its price reaches a sufficientl high liquidation point. The
top graph corresponds to the case in which realization utility has a linear functional form.
The bottom graph corresponds to the case in which realization utility has a piecewise-
linear functional form, so that the investor is 1.5 times as sensitive to realized losses as to
realized gains.
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Fig. 2. Sensitivity of the liquidation point at which an investor sells a stock, and of the
initial utility from buying it, to the stock’s expected excess capital gain μ, its standard
deviation σ, and the effective time discount rate δ. The investor derives utility from re-
alized gains and losses. The solid lines correspond to the case where realization utility
has a linear functional form. The dashed lines correspond to the case where realization
utility has a piecewise-linear functional form, so that the investor is 1.5 times as sensitive
to realized losses as to realized gains.







Transaction cost  k






Transaction cost  k




Liquidity shock arrival rate  ρ





Liquidity shock arrival rate  ρ
Fig. 3. Sensitivity of the liquidation point at which an investor sells a stock, and of
the initial utility from buying it, to the transaction cost k and the arrival rate ρ of an
exogeneous liquidity shock. The investor derives utility from realized gains and losses.
Realization utility has a linear functional form.
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Fig. 4. Sensitivity of the liquidation point at which an investor sells a stock, and of the
initial utility from buying it, to λ, his relative sensitivity to realized losses as opposed to
realized gains.
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Fig. 5. Probability that an investor who derives utility from realized gains and losses will
sella specifi stockwithina year of buyingit. The graphsshowhowthisprobabilityvaries
with the stock’s expected excess capital gain μ, its standard deviation σ, the effective time
discount rate δ, the transaction cost k, and the relative sensitivity to realized losses as
opposed to realized gains λ.























































Fig. 6. Expected return, standard deviation, and probability of sale in an economy pop-
ulated by investors who derive utility from realized gains and losses. The top-left graph
showsthe equilibriumrelationshipbetween expected excess return and standard deviation
in a cross-section of stocks. The top-right graph shows, for the same cross-section, the
equilibriumrelationshipbetween a stock’sexpected excess return and the probabilitythat,
after buying the stock, an investor sells it within a year of purchase. Realization utilityhas
a piecewise-linear functional form, so that investors are 1.5 times as sensitive to realized
losses as to realized gains.
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